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Defendant, Carleen Neilson, files a reply brief to 
brief of respondent as follows: 
I. THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY 
In plaintiff's statement of facts, he asserts his own 
testimony as a basis for his factual conclusions without any ref-
erence to the court's Findings of Fact. For example, plaintiff 
makes allegations about how the parties came to live together 
prior to marriage; defendant's demeanor prior to and during the 
marriage; defendant's religious beliefs and intentions; the 
pre-marital and marital finances; and, plaintiff's sexual expec-
tations; and defendant's sexual performance, defendant's behav-
ior; and, conclusions about her motives. See Brief of Respon-
dent, pp. 3-10. For each conclusion plaintiff relies upon his 
own testimony, not the trial court's factual findings to support 
his assertions. Plaintiff ignores defendant's testimony to the 
contrary concerning the above allegations. Since, the 
plaintiff's allegations are mere assertions, not part of the 
trial court's factual findings, and specifically contradicted by 
defendant, such assertions are not properly fact to be relied 
upon by this Court. See Sharf v. BMG Construction, 700 P.2d 1068 
(Utah 1985). 
Plaintiff makes these allegations for one reason: to 
establish that he had a bad marriage. This supports his argument 
that because he had a bad marriage he should not be held respon-
sible for his obligations under the Prenuptial Agreement. 
Whether defendant was a bad marriage is not the issue. The issue 
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is whether the trial court correctly interpreted the Agreement 
and correctly applied the law. 
A. The Prenuptial Agreement Did Not "Promote" or "Encour-
age" Divorce. 
Defendant argues that the public policy of Utah pro-
motes marriage; and, that the Agreement violates public policy. 
Plaintiff refers to paragraph 9 of the Agreement as a "profiteer-
ing" provision. See Brief of Respondent, pp. 16-20. In effect, 
plaintiff argues that paragraph 9 acted as a financial incentive 
for defendant to try to induce plaintiff into filing an action 
for divorce by "abandoning the marriage and disregarding the mar-
riage vows," within "an undue short period of time" after the 
marriage. Id. at 18. Plaintiff's cites the following cases to 
support his argument: In re the Marriage of Nogherty, 215 Cal. 
Rptr. 76 (Cal. Ct. of App. 1985); and Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio 
St.3d 99, 464 N.E.2d 500 (1984). 
The trial court did not find that defendant totally 
disregarded her vows shortly after the marriage. The trial court 
found both parties were "totally noncommunicative," "hostile," 
and "did not discuss any marital concerns or problems" with each 
other. (R. 390-91) Importantly, the trial court found the 
defendant did not defraud plaintiff in entering into marriage. 
(R. 394, 396). No findings of the court suggest anything mali-
cious, defrauding or calculating on defendant's part. No find-
ings of the court indicate defendant disregarded her marital vows 
shortly into the marriage, any more than that plaintiff 
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disregarded his vows to work at making the marriage successful. 
Instead, the trial court's factual findings supports the argument 
that the marriage was in trouble from the start; and, that both 
parties contributed to its failure. Simply put, there is a world 
of difference between what plaintiff claims as justification for 
voiding the Agreement (disregarding the marital vows) and irrec-
oncilable differences. In this case, plaintiff proved irrecon-
cilable differences as grounds for a divorce and nothing more. 
The case of In re the Marriage of Nogherty id., support 
defendant's argument. Nogherty1s holding was based on the fol-
lowing factors: the prenuptial agreement did not define the sep-
arate character of property acquired prior to marriage; the 
prenuptial agreement did not deal with property upon death; under 
the prenuptial agreement, the wife still got $500,000 or half 
regardless of who initiated the divorce; the parties did not seek 
legal counsel prior to executing the prenuptial agreement; the 
husband testified he did not want to sign the prenuptial agree-
ment; the husband was not a lawyer; and, the parties signed the 
prenuptial agreement on the wedding day. (See In re Marriage of 
Nogherty, 215 Cal. Rept. at 153-6.) 
In this case the facts and the Agreement are fundamen-
tally different from Nogherty. The Agreement consists of a six 
page document. The document carefully articulated the community 
or separate nature of the parties1 property acquired prior to 
marriage, acquired during the marriage, and distributed upon its 
dissolution. See Prenuptial Agreement 111, defining the separate 
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nature of the property acquired prior to marriage; Prenuptial 
Agreement f6, the Prenuptial Agreement intentionally limits the 
rights of both parties to make a claim as to the other's estate; 
Prenuptial Agreement 19, defining the community nature of the 
stock during the marriage; Prenuptial Agreement 118, defining the 
division of property upon death. Unlike Noqherty, defendant did 
not get half of everything if she filed for divorce. It was only 
plaintiff who lost one-half of his stock upon his filing for 
divorce. Furthermore, plaintiff and defendant consulted attor-
neys; and, both agreed to sign the Agreement well before the wed-
ding date. Lastly, plaintiff was educated in law, a businessman 
all his life, and who understood the nature of contracts and the 
purpose of the Prenuptial Agreement. Plaintiff also cites the 
case of Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 1984). This case 
fortifies defendant's position that the Prenuptial Agreement was 
upheld even though the party seeking the divorce was provided a 
substantial sum in the Agreement if a divorce occurred. The 
dicta of the court cited by defendant refers to plaintiff in this 
action. It is plaintiff who abandoned the marriage and disre-
garded the marriage vow. He refused to work out problems and 
filed for annulment. 
Plaintiff ignores defendant's arguments that the 
Prenuptial Agreement's language promote a marriage and encourages 
the parties to work at resolving any difficulties. It was in 
error for the trial court to make a legal conclusion that the 
Prenuptial Agreement encouraged divorce. Plaintiff also ignores 
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the proposition that the trial court must independently construe 
the Agreement's language to determine whether it promotes 
divorce. Plaintiff ignores the proposition that the Agreement 
did not violate public policy simply because it disproportion-
ately disposes of property upon divorce. Plaintiff also argues 
the fact that the trial court specifically rejected a proposed 
finding of fact that stated the Prenuptial Agreement "encouraged 
divorce." The trial court's factual findings and legal conclu-
sions are erroneous because a prenuptial agreement that facili-
tates divorce (i.e. provides a mechanism for an easier separation 
and a definitive division of property) does not violate public 
policy. It is very different than a finding that the Agreement 
promoted divorce. The court refused to make a finding that the 
Agreement "encouraged" or promoted divorce. 
B. "Initiate" Means File for Divorce. 
1. Definition of Word. 
Plaintiff argues that the word "initiated" in paragraph 
9 of the Prenuptial Agreement means "due to the fault of one 
party . .' . the other party was forced to file a complaint for 
divorce." See Brief of Respondent, pp. 20-21. Plaintiff's argu-
ment robs the word "initiated" of its common and usual meaning. 
The word "initiated" means to "begin or set going." See Websters 
Third New International Dictionary, p. 1164 (1971). Initiated 
when applied in the context of the Agreement, and when given its 
correct meaning, means that plaintiff initiated divorce action 
when he filed for annulment; and, was therefore obligated by 
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paragraphs 9 and 10. (See also Rule 3 URCP, a civil action is 
commenced by the filing of a complaint.) Plaintiff filed his 
Petition, he commenced the action, he "initiated" the procedure 
on petition for dissolution of the marriage. 
2. The Parties' Intent 
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court found the 
Agreement ambiguous; and, did not reflect the parties1 intent. 
For that proposition, plaintiff cites his own testimony at trial. 
The trial court did not find the Agreement ambiguous. 
The court found that the Agreement did not accurately reflect the 
parties1 intentions. (R. 394). Assuming the Agreement was 
ambiguous, it was then the trial court's duty to determine the 
parties' intent. However, as noted above, the Agreement clearly 
stated the parties' intent; and consequently, that language was 
not ambiguous and the language of the Agreement should govern. 
Plaintiff argues he did not initiate an action for 
divorce, he initiated an action for annulment which he claims is 
conceptionally different. Plaintiff then argues that because the 
trial court, upon its own motion, gave the plaintiff a divorce he 
is not obligated under paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Agreement. 
Plaintiff's argument taken to its logical end means that even 
though plaintiff did not object to a divorce, the trial court 
abused its equitable discretion; or, that the parties are still 
married. 
When the court modified the complaint to assert at 
equity the remedy of divorce, plaintiff informed the court he 
-6-
wanted to end the marriage. Previously, and at that time, defen-
dant indicated she did not want to end the marriage; and, under 
no circumstances would she counterclaim for divorce. If plain-
tiff and defendant would have both objected to the trial court's 
motion, it would have been an abuse of the court's equitable dis-
cretion to dissolve their marriage without finding grounds for 
annulment. Since plaintiff's claim for annulment was denied and 
defendant had not counterclaimed for divorce, then the plaintiff 
tacitly initiated a divorce (by agreeing with the trial court's 
equitable remedy) or there was no dissolution of their marriage. 
A court cannot dissolve a marriage unless one party requests a 
divorce or an annulment and initiates an action to ohtain that 
relief. 
3. The Marriage Itself and Waiver of Mutual Rights 
was Sufficient Consideration for the Marriage. 
Plaintiff argues that consideration for the Prenuptial 
Agreement and the marriage contract failed because the defendant 
failed to change her lifestyle after marriage; and that she did 
not give plaintiff a "traditional" or "normal marital relation-
ship". Plaintiff's argument ignores the law, a judge's proper 
role in making factual and legal decisions, and the realities of 
life. 
A prenuptial agreement has vana consideration with a 
simple promise to marry. See Appellate Brief, pp. 18-20. The 
Agreement did not call for a "traditional" or "normal marital 
relationship", Id. The Agreement only called for the parties to 
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marry, which occurred. For the trial court to void the 
Prenuptial Agreement on any other basis or any other claim of 
failed consideration, was an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, 
the Agreement called for a mutual waiver of rights, which also 
constitutes valid consideration. 
As argued previously, it is not the proper role of the 
trial court to define what is a "normal marital relationship". 
See Appellate Brief of Appellate, pp. 17-20. For the court to 
use its own standards or judgment is simply too subjective. One 
person's definition of a "normal marriage" differs from another's 
view. Indeed, within marriage, partners have differing views as 
to what is a "normal marital relationship." 
In the 1980s there is no such thing as a "traditional" 
marriage because of the changes in social norms. These changing 
social norms truly prohibit any court or individual from coming 
up with a definition or absolute standard for a normal marriage. 
The trial court abused its discretion when it sought to 
define a "normal marital relationship" as the Prenuptial 
Agreement's consideration. The Prenuptial Agreement did not call 
for such consideration; and, therefore, the trial court erred as 
a matter of law. 
4. The Court Established the Parameters of the Trial 
Court's Equitable Power. 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court should have equi-
table power to disrupt the Prenuptial Agreement. See Brief of 
Respondent, pp. 26-28. For this proposition, plaintiff cites 
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Mathie v. Mathier 12 Utah 2d 116, 363 P.2d 779 (1961), and 
Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1982); and numerous 
other cases dealing with an unconscionability standard for normal 
contracts. _Id. Plaintiff does not argue that the Prenuptial 
Agreement was unconscionable, plaintiff doe$ argue that the trial 
court may set aside the Agreement at its own whim based upon some 
standard of fairness. Plaintiff's argument does not address the 
proposition that the court should adopt a particular standard for 
review of prenuptial agreements. The current standard for 
reviewing contracts is set forth in the Brief of Appellant, pp. 
22-24. Plaintiff fails to address this argument; and fails to 
attack the validity of the leading case in this area. Gant v. 
Gant, 328 S.E.2d 106 (W.Va. 1985). A fairness standard does not 
exist anywhere else in contract law; and, it should not exist 
with prenuptial agreements. Contracts are Sacred to the extent 
that two parties should be free to enter anlagreement and the 
court will enforce its terms. To adopt a fairness standard for 
prenuptial agreements would destroy the parties1 ability to con-
tract and virtually guarantee the inconsistent and differing 
results (on a case by case basis) when a trj.al court reviews 
prenuptial agreements. 
5. Defendant's Conduct was not Contemptual 
Plaintiff agrees that the trial ccj>urt erred in holding 
the domestic relations commissioner's recommendation was a bind-
ing order. See Brief of Respondent, pp. 29430. However, 
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plaintiff argues defendant was in contempt because she violated a 
stipulation. Id. 
Defendant was not in contempt because neither the stip-
ulation nor the commissioner's recommendation were binding 
orders. Plaintiff does not deny that defendant objected to the 
commissioner's recommendations; including, the proposed stipula-
tion which was included in the recommendations to restrain the 
parties from disposing of marital assets. The commissioner rec-
ommended a mutual restraining order preventing both parties from 
disposing of assets. Defendant properly filed objection and 
acted accordingly. Prior to the trial court's final determina-
tion, plaintiff like defendant disposed of stock. The trial 
court ruled that defendant had violated a commissioner's order 
(the commissioner's recommendation); and consequently was in con-
tempt. (R. 217) The trial court erred in its ruling. 
6. The Trial Court's Award of Attorneys' Fees was in 
Error. 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court has great discre-
tion in fixing attorneys' fees in a divorce action. According to 
plaintiff, this discretion includes ordering one party to pay his 
or her attorney costs. For that proposition, plaintiff cites 
Morrison v. Peek, 376 P.2d 58 (Colo. 1962). As plaintiff will 
demonstrate the trial court erred in: (1) ordering her to pay 
her own attorney; and, (2) fixing the specific amount she was to 
pay. In Morrison, the Colorado Supreme Court did not address the 
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issue of whether it was proper to order one party to pay nis or 
her own attorneys' fees. Rather it defined the issue as follows: 
Apparently the trial court was laboring under the impression 
that application for attorneys' fees was an order in behalf 
of Morrison [the parties' attorney] as against his own cli-
ent. We do not so construe Morrison's motion. It sought 
the entry of "an order" determining th^ fee to which he is 
entitled for representing plaintiff in 
action, . . . . 
the within 
In that case, the parties settled; and, the husband 
agreed to indemnify the wife from liability on a claim filed by 
attorney. Therefore, the attorney brought an action to determine 
the fee the husband owed for his wife's attorney. Consequently, 
the Colorado Supreme Court ruled it was appropriate for the trial 
court to set the amount of Morrison's fee. See Morrison v. Peek, 
376 P.2d at 60. 
That court did not specifically rtpach the issue of 
whether it was proper for a court to order one party to pay his 
or her own attorneys' fees. Furthermore, plaintiff ignores 
defendant's argument, and decided authority] that it was also an 
abused discretion to set the specific amount plaintiff was sup-
posed to pay her attorney. See Brief of Appellant Carleen 
Neilson, pp.29-30. 
The court abuses its discretion by ordering a party to 
pay his or her attorneys' fees; and, fixing the specific amount 
she or he is to pay. Such a determination interferes with the 
private contract between the party and his Or her attorney. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court found the defendant did not defraud 
plaintiff in entering the marriage contract. No finding suggests 
anything malicious or calculating on defendant's part. No find-
ing indicates that defendant consciously disregarded her marital 
vows. Instead, the trial court's factual findings only support 
the argument that the marriage was troubled from the start; and, 
that both parties contributed to its failure. Simply put, there 
is a real difference between what plaintiff claims as justifica-
tion for voiding the Agreement (disregarding the marital vows) 
and irreconcilable differences as grounds for divorce. The case 
should be remanded for enforcement of the terms of the Prenuptial 
Agreement and for a proper entry of judgment for attorneys' fees 
and costs. 
DATED t h i s ^ ^ f day of m^tuJ~~ , 1988. 
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